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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2356

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [CH](#) [IR](#) [SN](#)
SUBJECT: (S) SINGAPORE DETAINS CHROMIUM-NICKEL STEEL PLATES
SHIPMENT

REF: STATE 184097

Classified By: EP Counselor Ike Reed for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

11. (U) This is an action message. Post would appreciate Washington's responses to Singapore's questions posed in para 3 by no later than November 24, 2006.

(S) Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the following points (see para 3) in response to reftel demarche. Yvonne Ow, MFA Assistant Director, Counter Proliferation and International Security Branch, told Econoff on November 13 that, without information from the United States linking the chromium-nickel steel plates in question to Iran and its missile program, Singapore would not be able to hold the shipment beyond November 24 so as not to disrupt legitimate trade.

13. (S) BEGIN TEXT:

Secret/Releasable to the US

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Further to the information that the US Embassy in Singapore shared with MFA at 11:45 am on 8 Nov 2006 on the possible transshipment of chromium-nickel steel plates for Iran,s missile programme through Singapore, Singapore authorities acted on the information provided and found that the vessel &Pacific Bridge8 was at port in Singapore on 8 Nov 2006 and was off-loading the goods to a 2nd vessel, the &OOCL Antwerp8. OOCL Antwerp was scheduled to leave Singapore at 7:00 am on 9 Nov 2006 and call at Port Klang (Malaysia). The next port of call after Port Klang was Jebel Ali, Dubai.

In the evening of 8 Nov 2006, Singapore authorities offloaded the container of interest to ascertain whether it contained steel plates.

The authorities conducted a physical inspection of the cargo in the container and detained 3 cases of steel plates.

The authorities did not come across any information pertaining to the shipment/cargo that links it to either the two companies listed in the US, note; i.e. i) Sahand Aluminium Parts Industrial Company or SAPICO and, ii) Iran,s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), or the intended end-use in Iran,s missile re-entry vehicles programme.

Consistent with our support for counter-proliferation efforts in conformity with international laws and our domestic laws and regulations, and in the light of UNSC resolution 1696, Singapore will continue to take appropriate steps in respect of the current investigations. In view of the good cooperation with the US, we would appreciate further information as follows:

a) Would the US be able to provide more information on the technical specifications of the chromium-nickel steel plates?

b) In the US, note, it was stated that the steel plates, though not controlled by the MTCR, can be used in manufacturing missile reentry vehicles. We would appreciate more background and technical information on how the steel plates can be part of a missile programme.

c) From our investigations, there are no indications that the steel plates are bound for Iran. Would the US be able to provide more information on the steel plates, link to Iran?

d) Any other information regarding the supplier and end-user of the steel plates.

Any other relevant and specific information regarding the abovementioned case will greatly assist our on-going efforts.

We would appreciate replies to the above by 24 November 2006.

In the absence of further information and evidence linking the steel plates to Iran,s missile programme, it is not possible for Singapore to continue to detain the steel plates.

13 November 2006

END TEXT.
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